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Bank regulation and stock market stability across countries  
 
1. Introduction 
   The stream of bank failures across the globe in the past two decades has encouraged both national 
and international financial institutions to introduce a raft of new bank regulations to strengthen 
confidence, stability and efficiency in the sector. Many governments and their banking sectors 
have invested significant resources to ensure compliance with these new regulatory measures in 
order to attract or maintain international investment flows, to avoid future banking crises, and to 
underpin broader stock market stability. Empirical studies suggest that successive bank failures 
have been triggered by both external institutional settings and internal, bank-specific factors. 
External factors include inappropriate supervision, regulation, macroeconomic policies, and 
governance structures in relation to the financial system (Delis and Staikouras, 2011; Masciandaro 
et al., 2013). Other scholars present evidence of the impact of regulation and supervisory policy 
on bank performance and efficiency (Barth et al., 2004; Beck et al., 2006; Chortareas et al., 2012). 
However, there is a dearth of research on the impact of bank regulation on stock market stability. 
To address the shortcomings of the existing literature, the main purpose of this paper is to provide 
an international study of the influence of bank capital strength and external auditing requirements 
on stock market stability during the global financial crisis of 2007/8, in so doing highlighting issues 
and providing some pointers for the development of the international banking industry. Our 
empirical results show that both mandatory capital strength requirements and the existence of 
mandatory audit increase stock market stability across countries. In addition, higher bank 
profitability leads to greater stock market stability. 
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Our paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, it provides evidence on the 
impact of capital strength and external auditing regulations on stock market stability during the 
recent global financial crisis, thereby providing some insight for international financial institutions, 
governments and regulators as countries seek to enhance their financial regulation and policy. 
Second, we show that banks need to comply with tighter mandatory capital strength practices in 
order to legitimise their activities in countries with weak institutions and economic freedom 
policies, thereby providing support for an agency theory approach (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Finally, our paper provides some useful practical guidelines for policy-makers and regulators in 
both developed and developing countries to support improved regulation for the purpose of 
achieving greater stock market stability and in order to cope with the increasing complexity which 
characterises the banking business environment. 
   The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical and 
empirical literature and sets out the hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 discusses the scope of the 
data, its collection and formatting, and the statistical and modelling methodology employed. The 
discussion of the empirical results is given in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 summarises and 
concludes, and provides recommendations for both policy makers and future research in the field. 
 
2. Background and hypothesis development 
2.1 Capital strength 
   The capital strength of a bank serves a risk-sharing function whereby capital is a buffer against 
the improper disposal of assets as well as debt-holder losses (Kilinc and Neyaphti, 2012). The 
rationale underpinning the regulation of capital strength is that banks need to hold an appropriate 
level of capital in order to reduce the risk of failure and achieve target operational efficiency levels 
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(Chortareas et al., 2012). Building on the agency theory of Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) argue that capital requirements are employed as an instrument for 
the delegation of control rights to a regulator on behalf of small depositors who are unwilling, or 
do not have the resources, to monitor bank activities and assets during a financial crisis. Recently, 
several scholars highlight the relationship between bank capital requirements, bank behaviour 
(Borio and Zhu, 2012), bank performance (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Berger and Bouwman, 2013; 
Chortareas et al., 2012), bank failure (Cole and White, 2012), output and inflation volatility 
(Angeloni and Faia, 2013), and the speed of bank capital structure adjustments (Jonghe and 
Oztekin, 2015). For example, Borio and Zhu (2012) argue that ignoring a minimum capital 
requirement can affect bank behaviour through reputational costs, unfavourable market responses, 
and  new prudential procedures for bank risk management frameworks. In this context, Berger and 
Bouwman (2013) study US banks over the period 1984 to 2010 and find empirical evidence that 
greater capital improves the performance (in terms of both the probability of survival and market 
share) of small banks, exhibiting the same effect on medium and large bank performance though 
only in times of banking crises. Similarly, Angeloni and Faia (2013) find that anti-cyclical capital 
requirement ratios which require banks to increase capital strength in times of expansion, reduce 
both output and inflation volatility and increase welfare. Other scholars such as Jonghe and 
Oztekin (2015) find, in a study of banks in 64 countries over the period 1994 to 2010, that banks 
make more rapid capital structure adjustments in countries with more stringent capital strength 
requirements, particularly in times of crises.  
   Other studies show that bank capital requirements are marginally positively associated with 
efficiency (Barth et al., 2013), though exacerbate fluctuations in the business cycle (Blum and 
Hellwig, 1995) and are ineffective in the control of bank risk (Delis and Staikouras, 2011). Delis 
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and Staikouras argue that a capital strength requirement is viewed as a tool to force banks to share 
risk and to provide a mechanism to absorb bank losses. They argue further that somewhat 
contrasting findings of the existing literature with regard to the relative merits of capital strength 
requirements tend to result from differences in bank-specific characteristics and/or country-level 
differences such as the degree of information asymmetry between corporate management and 
investors, and the presence or otherwise of deposit insurance schemes. 
   On the basis of the existing literature, our first hypothesis therefore states that: 
 H1: There is a positive relationship between bank capital strength and stock market stability 
across countries. 
 
2.2. Bank supervision 
Bank supervision comprises the continuous monitoring of law-on-the-books and the institution of 
remedial measures to address violations (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2002). Given 
that producing mandated regulations may not be enough in itself to ensure effective 
implementation and enforcement (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012), continuous supervision can discipline 
bank behaviour to ensure a better understanding, and thus a fair pricing, of bank risk by market 
participants (Caprio et al., 2008) and can reduce market failure (Beck et al., 2006). Consistent with 
agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), bank management and other stakeholders may pursue 
conflicting goals. As a result of this moral hazard problem, various public and private mechanisms 
may be instituted to align incentives and to supplement internal bank governance, including 
external auditing.  
    External auditors play an important role in the banking industry, acting as a mechanism to align 
the incentives of stakeholders, thereby providing a supplementary mechanism to bank governance. 
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Empirical studies investigate the relationship between external audit and stock performance 
(Mitton, 2002), bank losses (Jin et al., 2011), and information uncertainty (Autore et al., 2009). 
For example, evidence from Jin et al., in a study of US banks for the year 2006, find that auditor 
type and auditor industry specialization are predictors of bank failure, as high quality auditing 
reduces the probability of bank failure by assuring the quality of a bank’s financial information. 
Other scholars highlight the value relevance of audit opinions and their heterogeneous information 
content (Holder-Webb and Wilkins, 2000; Pei and Hamill, 2013). For example, Chen et al. (2000) 
find in a study of Chinese companies over the period 1995 to 1997 that qualified opinions are 
associated with significant negative market returns.  More recently, in another study of Chinese 
firms, Pei and Hamill (2013) find that audit opinions possess significant information heterogeneity 
in a study over the period 1998 to 2005. They present evidence that auditor opinions give rise to 
significant returns responses as they contain value relevant information for investor pricing 
decisions. They also argue that in a less competitive information environment, investors value 
regulated financial statements more highly than in a more competitive information environment.   
   Thus, our second hypothesis states that:  
H2: There is a positive relationship between bank external mandatory auditing and stock market 
stability across countries. 
 
2.3. Institutional settings and economic freedom characteristics 
  Some scholars argue that institutional settings are in theory one of the main factors that can create 
path dependence towards financial market development (North, 1990). At a country level, several 
existing studies highlight the relationship between legal institutions and stock market 
development. For example, La Porta et al. (1998) find that the presence of shareholder protection 
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structures, such as the breadth of the equity market, company access to external finance, and so 
on, has a significant positive impact on stock market development. Another body of studies 
illustrates the influence of politicians in the mandating of legal rules and reducing the power of 
banks and pension funds (Roe, 1990), as well as the influence of political coalition changes on 
financial development (Rajan and Zingales, 2000). At the firm level, a number of studies highlight 
the relationship between the external institutional environment, corporate governance mechanisms 
and firm performance (Chen et al., 2011; Klapper and Love, 2002; Bruno and Classens, 2010). 
For example, Klapper and Love find that corporate governance practices and performance are poor 
in countries with a weak legal environment. Bushman et al. (2004) find in an international study 
for the year 1995 that governance transparency is higher in those countries with legal origins in 
common law, whereas financial transparency is higher in countries with a weak political economy 
(such as in the case of state ownership). They argue that a government can institute weak 
accounting and disclosure requirements, relax the enforcement of current disclosure requirements, 
or exert pressure on the media in order to hold back the distribution of firm specific information 
for the benefit of specific interest groups. More recently, Aebi et al. (2011) find that US banks 
with independent risk management show significantly higher stock returns and firm return on 
equity during the global financial crisis.  
   Therefore, our third hypothesis states that: 
H3: The relationship between bank mandatory regulations and stock market stability is conditional 
upon the existence of high quality institutional settings and economic freedom characteristics. 
2.4. Stock market stability 
   Stock market movements reflect, amongst other factors, changes in company fundamentals, a 
position predicated upon conventional agency and signalling theories. Durnev et al. (2009) argue 
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that stock market stability is built upon a foundation of share price accuracy whereby stock markets 
with a high information content tend to enjoy greater price accuracy, resulting in increased market 
stability, and vice versa. A stock’s share price is considered more accurate if it reflects greater 
unobservable company-specific information rather than observable market or industry information 
(Durnev et al., 2003). Many studies in the existing literature show that stock market accuracy 
conveys informational efficiency (Chen et al., 2007; Durnev et al., 2003; Morck et al., 2000). 
Consistent with the weight of the existing literature, we employ share price accuracy, as given by 
the R2 statistic (Durnev et al., 2003), as a proxy for stock market stability. Furthermore, we 
implement the methodology of Li et al. (2014) to ensure the reliability of the R2 statistic. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. The dataset 
   We collect data on mandatory capital strength and external audit regulation during the global 
financial crisis of 2007/8 in order to investigate whether they exerted an impact upon stock market 
stability. The data are obtained from a survey of the World Bank and the US Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) for the banking industry across 43 countries. Details of the 
study countries and constituent banks are shown in Table 1. All of the variables in this paper are 
measured at the country level. This dataset is unique as it provides an expert assessment of the 
existence, legislative state, and implementation of regulations in practice (Barth et al., 2008). The 
time period is selected to show the impact of institutional settings across countries during the 
global financial crisis, and to investigate how regulations were applied within different countries. 
Stock market stability is measured by means of the R2 statistic which reflects the ‘extent to which 
a firm’s share price moves with the prices of all the other firms in the economy’ (Durnev et al., 
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2003; Morck et al., 2000). The data required to measure the R2 statistic are obtained from the 
DataStream financial database, and the final selection of banks is driven by data availability.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
3.2. Gauging stock market stability 
   Stock market stability is proxied by means of the R-square (R2) statistic which is calculated as 
observable market risk scaled by the less observable firm-specific risk plus the observable market 
risk, consistent with Durnev et al. (2003). A low R2 statistic signals greater bank share price 
accuracy and hence greater stock market stability, that is, a low R2 signals share price accuracy 
where a firm’s share price relies more on bank-specific financial information disclosure than on 
market or industry factors. A generalized least squares regression (GLS) modelling approach is 
employed to estimate the R2 statistic for each of the 385 banks across the 43 sample countries by 
means of the following approach, consistent with Durnev et al. (2003), and Durnev et al. (2009). 
First, in a GLS model, weekly stock returns for each bank are regressed on the returns of the whole 
market for a given country and the returns on the banking sector index. Weekly returns are used 
to control for semi-annual dividends and earnings announcements. Second, the R2 statistic for each 
bank is determined as given in Equation 1: 
 𝑅𝑅2 = 𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚2 /(𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚2 + 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2)    (1) 
Where: 
𝑅𝑅2 = stock market stability 
𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚
2  = variance of market returns 
σ2 ε  = variance of the generalized multiple regression residuals 
 
Third, an annualised R2 statistic is computed for each bank which is then aggregated at the country 
level for the year 2008. Fourth, the asynchronicity measure (ф), which is simply the logarithmic 
inverse of R2, is computed to facilitate comparison of the results. A high ф statistic signals no co-
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movement between bank, market and industry returns due to greater bank-specific information 
transparency, and hence high stock market stability. At the other extreme, a low ф statistic signals 
that all of the movement in bank stock returns is explained by market and industry returns rather 
than by individual bank-specific information, and hence this implies low stock market stability 
(Hutton et al., 2009). Finally, we control for the main components of the R2 statistic: market wide 
return volatility, beta and idiosyncratic risk. We then check the findings across different 
institutional settings and economic freedom characteristics, following the methodology of Li et al. 
(2014). 
 
3.3. The modelling approach 
   We apply a simple multiple regression modelling approach to examine the relationship between 
stock market stability and its potential drivers such as bank capital strength and auditing 
requirements. These key variables along with several control variables are given in Equation 2: 
ф𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
                             +𝛽𝛽5𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑇𝑇𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇) + 𝛽𝛽7(𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽8(𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖               (2) 
Where: 
ф = logarithmic inverse of R2 measured as [ln ((1-R2)/R2)] for bank i at time t; 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆) = natural 
logarithm of company assets; 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆) = natural logarithm of return on equity; 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) = 
natural logarithm of tangible assets per share; 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆) = natural logarithm of the change in the 
Standard and Poor’s stock market index; 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑇𝑇𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇) = natural logarithm of gross domestic product 
growth; ln(LIST)= natural logarithm of number of listed companies in the stock market; 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆= 
capital strength; 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺 = mandatory auditing; 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = error term. 
 
The capital strength dummy variable (CAPS) takes a value of one if the minimum ratio of capital 
strength is adjusted for bank credit risk, or zero otherwise. The mandatory auditing dummy 
variable (AUD) takes a value of one if there are specific regulatory requirements for the extent or 
nature of the audit, or zero otherwise. Table 2 provides a list of model variable labels, along with 
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their definition and the source of the component data items. Finally, consistent with Morck et al. 
(2000), the returns of bank shares which traded for less than 30 weeks (120 days) of the year are 
excluded from the sample to eliminate the effect of thin trading activity.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
3.4. Model control variables 
   We include several control variables in our models, consistent with the literature, to control for 
the influence of bank-specific characteristics and differences in the macroeconomic environments 
of the respective countries. The bank-specific variables are obtained from the DataStream financial 
database, while the macroeconomic environment indicators are obtained from the World Bank 
(World Development Indicators). Such variables include bank size (SIZE), the return on equity 
(ROE), asset tangibility per share (TANG), gross domestic product per capita growth (GDPG), and 
annual percentage change in the global S&P index (SPC) to control for differences across countries 
in stock market reaction to the global financial crisis. A natural logarithm transformation is applied 
to the control variables to increase the goodness of fit of the regression models. 
  
3.5. Country level institutional settings and economic freedom characteristics 
   Two institutional variables are obtained from Kaufmann et al. (2010): the rule of law (LAW) and 
government effectiveness (GOV). The former captures perceptions of the extent to which agents 
have confidence in, and abide by, the rules of society; while the later captures perceptions of the 
quality of public services, the quality of the civil service, and the degree of its independence from 
political pressures. The economic freedom variables are obtained from the Heritage Foundation 
(2008). Several such variables are included in our models: property rights (PR), freedom from 
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corruption (FCRP), and freedom of trade (FTRD). Here, all of the five variables above have a 
score ranging from 0 to 100, with high values representing stronger institutional settings or 
economic freedom characteristics. The scores are then transformed into indicator variables 
whereby each country scores a value of 1 if it is above the sample median value, or 0 otherwise.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
   Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the study variables. It is evident that the variables 
exhibit high standard deviations in relation to their means which reduces the possibility of sample 
selection bias. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
   Table 4 presents a correlation matrix for the main study variables. The dependent variable, the 
stock market stability (ф) statistic, is significantly positively correlated with bank profitability at 
the 10% level. Significant correlations are checked further by computing the variance inflation 
factor (VIF) test statistic in each model to control for multicollinearity. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
4.2. The models 
   This paper employs a two-step modelling approach. First, a GLS regression is estimated to 
provide the dependent variable R2 statistic for each of the 385 banks in the sample. Table 3 shows 
that the stock market stability (ф) statistic (the inverse indicator of R2) ranges from a minimum 
value of -16.36 to a maximum value of 0.94, with a standard deviation of 4.09. Second, we estimate 
simple multiple regressions for a range of model specifications of stock market stability, as 
presented in Table 5. Model 1, which includes only firm-specific and external environment control 
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variables, reveals that the stock market stability (ф) statistic has a significant positive relationship 
with bank profitability at the 1% level, and a significant negative relationship with the growth rate 
of GDP per capita at the 10% level. The overall model has an adjusted R2 of 0.22, with a significant 
F-statistic at the 5% level. In the remaining models, the mandatory regulation variables are 
introduced one variable at a time in addition to the control variables. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
   Model 2 shows that high capital strength significantly increases stock market stability at the 5% 
level. The overall model has an adjusted R2 of 0.29, with a significant F-statistic at the 1% level. 
Therefore, hypothesis H1 is supported. Market participants value capital strength as an important 
bank buffer in times of financial crisis in order to ensure the soundness and stability of the banking 
system (Chortareas et al., 2012). In addition, the result reflects the impact on capital requirements 
of the development of financial systems and international control systems during the 2007/8 
financial crisis across countries (Boot et al., 2001), in contrast to the failure of capital requirements 
to prevent bank problems during the 1990s in certain developing countries (Ozyildirim, 2010).  
   In Model 3, the mandatory audit variable is introduced, and it has a significant positive impact 
on stock market stability at the 1% level, which provides support for hypothesis H2. The overall 
model has an adjusted R2 of 0.37, with a significant F-statistic at the 1% level. It is argued that 
banks facing financial problems can maintain capital requirements up until a point close to failure, 
and therefore other signals become more important such as supervisory information or market 
variables (Mayes, 2009). However, since supervisory information may not be valuable to market 
participants due to secrecy, self-interest or political capture practices, the existence of the external 
auditor becomes more important, especially in times of crisis, as an expert channel for inside 
information to the public (Jin et al., 2011; Mitton, 2002). In Model 4, the capital strength and 
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mandatory audit variables are introduced together to evaluate their relative contribution. Both 
variables retain their positive relationship with the stock market stability (ф) statistic, at the 10% 
and 1% levels, respectively. The overall model has an adjusted R2 of 0.42, with a significant F-
statistic at the 1% level. In Model 5, we introduce two main components of the R2 statistic: market 
wide return volatility, Ln(σ2rm), and beta, Ln(β2). The results indicate that the capital strength and 
mandatory audit variables maintain their significant impact on the stock market stability (ф) 
statistic. The overall model has an adjusted R2 of 0.45, with a significant F-statistic at the 1% level. 
Finally, we substitute the stock market stability (ф) statistic with idiosyncratic risk, Ln(σ2ε), in 
Model 6. The results indicate that the mandatory audit variable maintains a significant positive 
relationship with the stock market stability (ф) statistic. The overall model has an adjusted R2 of 
0.52, with a significant F-statistic at the 1% level. The models show no sign of significant 
multicollinearity among the control variables, with variance inflation factors within the acceptable 
limits of 5 degrees. In addition, there is no significant heteroscedasticity in the residuals in relation 
to the Goldfeld–Quandt test statistic.  
 
4.3. Country level institutional settings and economic freedom characteristics 
   We estimate the model again to test the relationship between stock market stability and bank 
regulations under different institutional settings and economic freedom characteristics across 
countries by dividing our overall sample into subsamples which are high or low in relation to a 
particular dimension. Models 1 and 2 of Table 6 show that capital strength (CAPS) has a significant 
positive influence on stock market stability at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively, across countries 
with strong institutional settings. The overall models have adjusted R2 statistics of 0.45 and 0.42, 
respectively, with significant F-statistics at the 5% level. Thus, capital strength requirements 
16 
 
increase stock market stability in countries with a strong rule of law (LAW) and strong government 
effectiveness (GOV). Banks should comply with stronger capital strength requirements in order to 
legitimise their activities and underpin stock market stability, especially in countries with weak 
property rights institutions, consistent with hypothesis H3. Furthermore, the t-test for equality of 
means between the low and high groups for the LAW and GOV variables shows that CAPS is 
significantly different for the two groups at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Thus, banks in 
countries with high rule of law and government effectiveness measures employed greater capital 
strength during the financial crisis of 2007/8 and provide support for the results in Models 1 and 
2. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
   Similarly, capital strength (CAPS) has a significant positive influence on stock market stability 
across countries with strong (high) economic freedom characteristics in Models 3, 4 and 5 at the 
5%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The overall models have adjusted R2 statistics of 0.44, 0.41 
and 0.32, respectively, with significant F-statistics at the 5% level. This implies that countries with 
strong economic freedom variables such as property rights (PR), freedom from corruption (FCRP), 
and the freedom of trade (FTRD) index demand stronger capital strength requirements in order to 
increase stock market stability, consistent with hypothesis H3. Thus, the existence of strong 
economic freedom characteristics appears to induce greater protection for stakeholders’ wealth, 
which in turn increases stock market stability. The t-test for equality of means between the low 
and high groups for PR, FCRP and FTRD shows that CAPS is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. Thus, banks in countries with strong property rights, freedom from corruption, 
and freedom of trade employed greater capital strength, providing support for the results in Models 
3 to 5. 
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4.4. Robustness checks  
   A number of additional tests are conducted to ensure the reliability of the models estimated. 
First, we identify a wider set of potential independent variables to overcome the potential problem 
of endogeneity due to omitted variable bias. Several additional variables are tested such as: 
dividend yield, stock turnover, sales growth, dividend pay-out, price to book value, bank 
concentration, the degree of government ownership of banks, the inflation rate, GDP per capita, 
and bank stock market capitalization. The control variables are then selected and tested on the 
basis of the maximum log likelihood function to preserve degrees of freedom given the small 
sample of countries. However, our empirical results are found to be qualitatively similar to those 
given in Table 5. Second, the sample countries were divided into two groups using the mean bank 
concentration ratio (bank market capitalization to stock market capitalization) of 0.12 as a cut-off 
point. Countries above the mean take a value of 1, and below the mean take the value of 0. The t-
test for equality of means between the two groups shows that the stock market stability (ф) statistic 
has an insignificant mean difference of -0.37 which reduces the possibility of measurement error 
bias in this variable. Third, we test whether the relationship between stock market stability and 
bank regulation varies with the presence or absence of a banking crisis across countries. The 
sample countries are initially divided into two groups: countries which did not suffer a banking 
crisis (dummy variable = 0) and countries which suffered a banking crisis (dummy variable = 1). 
The t-test for equality of means between the two groups shows that CAPS and AUD exhibit a mean 
difference of -0.37 and -0.23, respectively, both significant at the 5% level. This implies that 
countries not suffering a banking crisis enjoyed greater capital strength and had stricter mandatory 
auditing requirements. The second group, countries suffering a banking crisis, are further divided 
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into two sub-groups to represent countries where all bank stock prices moved together (low stock 
market stability, or low ф), and countries where some banks survived and others did not (high 
stock market stability, or high ф). The t-test for equality of means between the two sub-groups 
shows that capital strength (CAPS) exhibits a significant mean difference at the 5% level. This 
supports the importance of a bank capital strength requirement during banking crises, while 
mandatory auditing requirements (AUD) vary little across the two sub-groups. Fourth, the top and 
bottom 2% of the sample size were dropped to avoid the impact of outliers. The model (OLS) was 
then re-estimated and the results were found to be qualitatively similar to those given in Table 5. 
   Finally, a GLS model with fixed effects is estimated to take into consideration differences 
between countries in terms of geographical regions and income groups. The countries are divided 
into seven regions: East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, 
Middle East and North Africa, North America, South Asia and Sub-Sahara Africa, consistent with 
the approach of the World Bank. The countries are also divided into three income groups according 
to the World Bank classification, sorting them into high income, upper middle income, and lower 
middle income groups. The empirical results are given in Table 7, and the models which include 
fixed effects for geographical regions (WBR) and income groups (WBI), confirm the results 
presented earlier in Table 5. Therefore, even when we control for country geographical region and 
country income, the results remain broadly the same.  
 [Insert Table 7 here] 
    
5. Conclusion 
   Following the global financial crisis of 2007/8, a raft of mandatory regulations were drafted and 
implemented both to strengthen banks and to bolster broader stock market stability. This paper 
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investigates whether bank mandatory capital strength and external audit requirements, which are 
intended to help preserve stock market stability in times of crisis, are actually valued by market 
participants. Our results show that capital strength and the existence of mandatory audit in banks 
both significantly increase stock market stability, consistent with agency theory, after controlling 
for bank-specific characteristics and differences in macroeconomic environments across countries. 
Furthermore, our results show that weak country institutional structures and economic freedom 
policies necessitate stronger mandatory requirements to ensure legitimate (anti self-dealing) 
banking activities. Thus, improvements in legal systems should be a key focus for ensuring stock 
market development within countries, and to some degree banks can institute their own good 
corporate governance practices (i.e. independent risk management) to overcome shortcomings in 
laws and their enforcement within a country (Klapper and Love, 2002), in turn hopefully dealing 
with the negative shock of future financial crises. However, banks need to increase stakeholder 
awareness and understanding of such initiatives in order to counter unfavourable market reactions 
which may arise during normal market conditions in response to high implementation costs (Aebi 
et al., 2011). A limitation of our study results is that we do not take into consideration the impact 
of different types of banks on stock market stability due to data availability constraints and the 
differences in the quality of accounting information that exist across countries. Future research 
might focus on the introduction of other explanatory variables such as bank corporate governance 
factors, or may usefully investigate other financial crises over recent decades. Further, researchers 
might assess the relative costs and benefits of bank regulations and their impact on bank 
performance and risk taking, and longer term issues concerning the implementation and 
enforcement of international banking regulation, supervision and disclosure. 
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Table 1 
The countries and number of banks included in the study sample 
 
Country N % Country N % Country N % 
Argentina 7 2 India 23 6 Portugal 10 3 
Australia 6 1 Indonesia 6 1 Romania 3 1 
Austria 6 1 Ireland 1 1 Russia 7 2 
Belgium 4 1 Israel 5 1 Singapore 3 1 
Brazil 7 2 Italy 18 5 Slovakia 2 1 
Bulgaria 4 1 Japan 69 18 Slovenia 2 1 
Canada 8 2 Luxembourg 2 1 South Africa 6 1 
Chile 7 2 Malaysia 11 3 South Korea 6 1 
China 6 1 Mexico 3 1 Spain 12 3 
Egypt 6 1 Morocco 10 3 Switzerland 19 5 
France 12 3 Netherland 2 1 Thailand 11 3 
Germany 6 1 Norway 3 1 United Kingdom 5 1 
Greece 8 2 Peru 5 1 United States Of America 35 9 
Hong Kong 5 1 Philippine 5 1    
Hungary 1 1 Poland 8 2    
Number of study countries 43 
Number of banks in the study 385 
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Table 2 
Summary of variables and source of data 
Panel A: Stock market stability  
ф Logarithmic inverse of R2 measured as [ln ((1-R2)/R2)] Manually computed 
Panel B: Bank regulation   
CAPS Capital strength (dummy variable which takes a value of one if the minimum ratio of capital 
strength is adjusted for bank credit risk, or zero otherwise).   
Barth et al.(2008) 
AUD Mandatory auditing (dummy variable which takes a value of one if there are specific regulatory 
requirements for the extent or nature of the audit, or zero otherwise).  
Barth et al.(2008) 
Panel C: Control variables  
LnSIZE Natural logarithm of total assets. DataStream  
LnROE Natural logarithm of net income to equity. DataStream  
LnTANG Natural logarithm of tangible assets per share. DataStream  
LnSPC Natural logarithm of the annual percentage change in the global S&P index. The World Bank 
LnGDPG Natural logarithm of the annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on constant 
local currency. 
The World Bank  
LnLIST Natural logarithm of number of listed companies in the stock market. The World Bank 
Ln(σ2rm) Natural logarithm of market volatility measured as the variance of the stock market return. Manually 
computed 
Ln(β2) Natural logarithm of beta square measured as covariance of bank stock price return and market 
return on variance of market return. 
Manually 
computed 
Ln(σ2ε) Natural logarithm of idiosyncratic volatility measured as the variance of residuals from a 
regression of bank stock returns on the market and industry returns. 
Manually 
computed 
BC Bank crisis (dummy variable which takes a value of one if there is a bank crisis in a country for 
year 2008, or zero otherwise).   
The World Bank 
WBR Indicator variable for the seven geographical regions (fixed effects).  The World Bank 
WBI Indicator variable for the three income groups (fixed effects). The World Bank 
Panel D: Country institutional settings 
LAW Rule of law index captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in, and 
abide by, the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property 
rights, the police, and the courts, crime and violence (Dummy variable which takes a value of 
one if there is high rule of law in a country for year 2008, or zero otherwise).   
Kaufmann et al. 
(2010) 
GOV Government effectiveness index captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality 
of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment 
to such policies (Dummy variable which takes a value of one if there is high government 
effectiveness in a country for year 2008, or zero otherwise). 
Kaufmann et al. 
(2010) 
Panel E: Economic Freedom Characteristics 
PR Property rights index assesses the ability of individuals to accumulate private property (Dummy 
variable which takes a value of one if there is high property rights in a country for year 2008, or 
zero otherwise).   
Heritage 
Foundation 
FCRP Freedom from corruption index which measures the level of corruption that introduces insecurity 
and uncertainty into economic relationships (Dummy variable which takes a value of one if there 
is high freedom from corruption in a country for year 2008, or zero otherwise). 
Heritage 
Foundation 
FTRD Freedom of trade index reflects an economy’s openness to the flow of world goods and services 
and the citizen’s ability to interact freely as buyer or seller in the international marketplace 
(Dummy variable which takes a value of one if there is high freedom of trade in a country for 
year 2008, or zero otherwise). 
Heritage 
Foundation 
All variables are measured at country level. 
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Table 3 
Descriptive statistics for the study variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All variables are defined in Table 2.  
 
  
 Minimum Maximum Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
ф -16.36 0.94 -5.27 -3.83 4.09 
LnSIZE 14.00 21.38 17.64 17.69 1.71 
LnROE 5.96 30.58 17.04 16.44 5.17 
LnTANG -6.49 6.35 1.37 1.47 2.20 
LnSPC -73.43 -16.96 -52.92 -53.33 12.28 
LnGDPG -10.12 10.28 1.39 1.28 3.36 
LnLIST 2.94 8.50 5.77 5.66 1.33 
CAPS 0.00 1.00 0.35 .000 0.48 
AUD 0.00 1.00 0.84 1.00 0.36 
Ln(σ2rm) -3.89 16.33 9.77 10.48 4.37 
Ln(β2) -8.21 1.63 -0.43 -0.21 1.23 
Ln(σ2ε) -8.48 21.18 5.03 5.12 6.06 
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Table 4 
Correlation matrix for the study variables  
 
All variables are defined in Table 2. The table shows Pearson correlation coefficients. The CAPS and AUD dummy variables are excluded. (***), 
(**), (*) indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
 ф LnSIZE LnROE LnTANG LnSPC LnGDPG LnLIST Ln(σ2rm) Ln(β2) Ln(σ2ε) 
ф 1          
LnSIZE 0.04 1         
LnROE 0.24* -0.14 1        
LnTANG 0.03 0.30** -0.11 1       
LnSPC -0.12 0.18 -0.15 0.16 1      
LnGDPG -0.16 -0.46*** 0.14 -0.23 -0.06 1     
LnLIST 0.05 0.45*** -0.28** 0.01 0.26 -0.00 1    
Ln(σ2rm) -0.16 0.40*** 0.01 0.14 -0.00 -0.15 0.09 1   
Ln(β2) 0.13 0.24 0.03 -0.22 -0.22 -0.29** 0.08 -0.03 1  
Ln(σ2ε) 0.62*** 0.33*** 0.18 0.02 -0.11 -0.23* 0.13 0.61*** 0.09 1 
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Table 5 
Models of the relationship between stock market stability and bank regulation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All variables are defined in Table 2. Standardized beta coefficients are presented. t-values are in parentheses and VIF is the variance inflation factor. 
(***), (**) and (*) indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
 ф  Ln(σ2ε) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5  Model 6 
Constant -20.25 (-2.32)** 
-21.51 
(-2.57)** 
-32.41 
(-3.71)*** 
-32.50 
(-3.86)*** 
-36.05 
(-4.16)*** 
 -35.78 
(-3.27)*** 
LnSIZE 0.028 (0.15) 
0.02 
(0.11) 
0.15 
(0.90) 
0.13 
(0.84) 
0.27 
(1.57) 
 0.21 
(1.31) 
LnROE 0.52 (3.46)*** 
0.54 
(3.73)*** 
0.50 
(3.71)*** 
0.51 
(3.96)*** 
0.52 
(4.17)*** 
 0.35 
(2.98)*** 
LnTANG 0.16 (1.11) 
0.15 
(1.14) 
0.15 
(1.18) 
0.15 
(1.21) 
0.09 
(0.72) 
 -0.06 
(-0.53) 
LnSPC -0.09 (-0.68) 
-0.07 
(-0.53) 
-0.16 
(-1.24) 
-0.13 
(-1.07) 
-0.16 
(-1.31) 
 -0.11 
(-0.99) 
GDPG -0.33 (-1.93)* 
-0.22 
(-1.28) 
-0.16 
(-.97) 
-0.08 
(-0.49) 
-0.13 
(-0.81) 
 -0.12 
(-0.81) 
LnLIST 0.24 (1.51) 
0.27 
(1.71)* 
0.27 
(1.83)* 
0.28 
(2.01)* 
0.25 
(1.80)* 
 0.22 
(1.68)* 
CAPS  0.30 (2.11)**  
0.25 
(1.92)* 
0.25 
(2.04)** 
 0.15 
(1.29) 
AUD   0.41 (3.13)*** 
0.38 
(2.96)*** 
0.42 
(3.34)*** 
 0.36 
(3.01)*** 
Ln(σ2rm)     -0.26 (-2.05)** 
 0.43 
(3.58)*** 
Ln(β2)     -0.13 (-0.91) 
 -0.11 
(-0.89) 
R2 0.33 0.40 0.47 0.53 0.58  0.63 
Adjusted R2 0.22 0.29 0.37 0.42 0.45  0.52 
Durbin-Watson  1.93 2.14 2.19 2.41 2.16  2.32 
F-statistic, (p-
value) 3.00** 3.46*** 4.60*** 4.80*** 4.56*** 
 5.59*** 
Max/Min VIF 1.86/1.10 1.86/1.13 1.97/1.13 1.99/1.13 2.32/1.24  2.32/1.24 
Valid N  43 43 43 43 43  43 
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Table 6 
Models of the relationship between stock market stability and bank regulation classified by 
country institutional settings and economic freedom characteristics 
 
 Ф 
 Institutional settings  Economic freedom characteristics 
 LAW GOV  PR FCRP FTRD 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 High High  High High High 
Constant -48.83 (-3.82)*** 
-45.25 
(-3.62)*** 
 -51.21 
(-3.70)*** 
-48.30 
(-3.51)*** 
-35.05 
(-2.66)** 
LnSIZE 0.46 (2.04)* 
0.44 
(1.93)* 
 0.44 
(2.00)* 
0.47 
(1.94)* 
0.24 
(0.94) 
LnROE 0.36 (1.55) 
0.21 
(1.02) 
 0.38 
(1.58) 
0.30 
(1.15) 
0.46 
(2.36)** 
LnTANG -0.00 (-0.00) 
-0.25 
(-1.41) 
 -0.03 
(-0.17) 
-0.02 
(-0.11) 
0.18 
(0.97) 
LnSPC -0.19 (-0.87) 
-0.27 
(-1.30) 
 -0.11 
(-0.45) 
-0.18 
(-0.73) 
-0.12 
(-0.52) 
LnGDPG 0.14 (0.78) 
0.13 
(0.72) 
 0.10 
(0.57) 
0.12 
(0.58) 
-0.11 
(-0.50) 
LnLIST 0.13 (0.53) 
0.15 
(0.64) 
 0.09 
(0.35) 
0.10 
(0.38) 
0.20 
(0.85) 
CAPS 0.46 (2.84)** 
0.49 
(3.01)*** 
 0.42 
(2.35)** 
0.45 
(2.58)** 
0.34 
(2.03)* 
R2 0.62 0.59  0.63 0.62 0.49 
Adjusted R2 0.45 0.42  0.44 0.41 0.32 
Durbin-Watson  1.85 1.87  1.86 1.88 1.61 
F-statistic (p-value) 3.60** 3.54**  3.44** 3.03** 2.83** 
Max/Min VIF 2.53/1.09 2.49/1.14  2.59/1.24 2.44/1.07 2.37/1.16 
T-test (CAPS) -2.15** -2.29***  -1.74* -2.03* -2.19*** 
Valid N  23 25  22 21 28 
 
All variables are defined in Table 2. Standardized beta coefficients are presented, t-values are in parentheses and VIF is the variance inflation factor. 
A reduced multiple regression analysis model is used to preserve degrees of freedom. Low scoring groups for Models 1 to 5 are insignificant (results 
not shown for reasons of brevity). The t-test for equality of means between low and high groups is presented. AUD is excluded from the analysis 
models as it has an insignificant mean difference between the low and high groups. (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 7 
Models of the relationship between stock market stability and bank regulation with country and 
income fixed effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All variables are defined in Table 2. A reduced multiple regression analysis model is used to preserve degrees of freedom. Standardized beta 
coefficients are presented. t-values are in parentheses and the VIF is the variance inflation factor. (***), (**) and (*) significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 
 ф 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant -27.72 (-2.28)** 
-29.80 
(0.01)** 
-42.22 
(0.00)*** 
-42.72 
(0.00)*** 
LnSIZE 0.27 (0.48) 
0.34 
(0.67) 
0.72 
(1.50) 
0.74 
(1.73)* 
LnROE 0.35 (2.38)** 
0.39 
(2.94)*** 
0.31 
(2.57)** 
0.35 
(3.22)*** 
LnTANG 0.29 (0.46) 
0.30 
(0.53) 
0.14 
(0.27) 
0.16 
(0.36) 
LnSPC -.102 (-1.31) 
-0.08 
(-1.24) 
-0.12 
(-2.01)* 
-0.11 
(-1.98)* 
LnGDPG -.179 (-0.56) 
0.04 
(0.15) 
0.19 
(0.70) 
0.35 
(1.38) 
LnLIST 0.84 (1.08) 
0.74 
(1.04) 
0.59 
(0.92) 
0.53 
(0.92) 
CAPS  3.45 (2.62)**  
2.91 
(2.72)** 
AUD   6.15 (3.72)*** 
5.62 
(3.78)*** 
WBR (fixed effects) Included Included Included Included 
WBI (fixed effects) Included Included Included Included 
R2 0.50 0.61 0.68 0.75 
Adjusted R2 0.20 0.35 0.46 0.57 
F-statistic, (p-value) 1.67* 2.33** 3.16*** 4.17*** 
Valid N  43 43 43 43 
